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Article 6

Book Reviews
Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel by Norman Fruman. New York: George
Braziller, 1971. Pp. xxiii + 607 .. $12.50.
Among Coleridgeans this book will produce waves of discussion. Up from
the ranks of the compatriots will come defenders of Coleridge's originality (at
once raising the question as to what it is to be original), while the unser
Shakespeare tribe of Gennanophiles will announce that here at last we have the
proof that most of STC's important ideas, especially those involving the psychology and metaphysics of art (theory of imagination), the aesthetic distinction
between organic and other types of form, the magisterial importance of Shakespeare as ultimate author-and perhaps other ideas I have forgotten to mentionderive almost word for word from various Gennan critics, chief of whom must
be August Wilhelm Schlegel, younger brother of Friedrich Schlegel. A battle
pro and contra will surely take place, and its field will have been staked out,
however roughly, by Nonnan Froman's Coleridge: The Damaged Archangel.
Fruman has once again gone over the ground harrowed by Rene Wellek,
who for many years now has been insisting that Coleridge was a weak philosopher and, since philosophy of some kind was his pretended contribution to
English studies, by the same token a weak critic. On any estimate Wellek's
Coleridge is a badly tarnished angel, if not completely fragmented. Fruman, of
course, does not intend his damaged archangel to be thrown into the junk-shop.
Rather, he wants a cleaner critical and historical approach to Coleridge, cleaner
and also, oddly, more commonsensical, than has hitherto been easy or likely.
He has done what Welle1e, under suspicion as a continental polymath of strong
Gennanic leanings, could hardly afford to do without incurring the anglophiliac
wrath: he has put together H against" STC a great big book of evidence for
an indictment of grand larceny, widespread embezzlement and gross, disingenuous
bad faith. The case has many angles, and it looks bad for the defendant. On
the other hand, only a skillful prosecutor wiII be able to steer such a rich
indictment past the pretrial publicity of the Coleridgean Establishment. Fortunately for the spectators, Norman Fruman is a very active, theatrically
impressive D.A.
The present "review" is, unfortunately for the expert who will certainly
want to examine Fruman's case more closely, a mere courtroom sketch, written
by a journalist, and smuggled out of closed sessions in the hope of suggesting
what the trial is like. I leave it to others who have gone adequately into the
critical work of the Gennan romantics and specifically of A. W. Schlegel and
Sche1ling to detennine whether The Damaged A1'changel has respected all the
main rules of evidence. Rather I shall be giving my impressions of an indictment,
without any clear confidence about the final sentence.
In compiling massive documentary evidence to show how, time after time,
one of Coleridge's more "inspired" moments was in fact a piece of shop-lifting,
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Noonan Fruman has had to write a big book. He notes, with Callimachus, that
"a big book is a big misfortune." But how could it have been otherwise?
Smallness of compass, imposed by other interests, was exactly what made it
difficult for Wellek to get his case against Coleridge to stick. (In the vast corridors of Wellek's History of Modern Literary Criticism Coleridge could only
have a chapter; there were others to consider, among them the very sages and
seers whose pockets the English visitor so cahnly rifled.) At least one reaction
to Wellek on STC's thefts from Schlegel or Schelling was animated by the
continuing thought that, well, there was another side to the whole businessperhaps after all Coleridge may have thought of Shakespeare in what amounted
to Schlegelian tenns, before going to Germany at the tum of the century, and
if so, then the "debts" to the German critic were complex, delicate and probably of no final importance. And anyway, one added as an afterthought,
Schlegel didn't really count for much as a literary critic-who, in the Englishspeaking world, had even read him? As a learned and luminous modern scholar
put it: "[Coleridge] also studied, and probably over-rated, the German Shal{espeare criticism of the preceding half-century."
Perhaps the right antidote to unthinking adulation of Coleridgean originality
(defined as perfect literal independence of previous authors) would be, besides
the massive dose provided by Froman in toto, a comment which he quotes from
the remarks of William Hazlitt, who, in December 1820, wrote a "Conversation
on the Drama with Coleridge." In this imaginary conversation HazIitt has
Coleridge say: '" But a French play (I think it is Schlegel who somewhere
makes the comparison, though I had myself, before I ever read Schlegel, made
the same remark) is like a child's garden set with slips of branches and Rowers,
stuck in the ground, not growing in it '." This is double-edged, to be sure,
striking at the "organicism" of the romantic school as much as at STC's foible
of unacknowledged free-loading. Fruman's note (page 488, no. 69) continues
in the same vein: "Elsewhere in this neglected essay Hazlitt has Coleridge
remark of the French: 'Their style of dancing is difficult; would it were
impossible.''' To this Hazlitt appends the footnote: "This expression is borrowed
from Dr. Johnson. However, as Dr. Johnson is not a German critic, Mr. C.
need not be supposed to acknowledge it." Hazlitt, in short, like Wordsworth
before him, and like De Quincey, knew that their acquaintance, Mr. C., was
something of a grifter. Had they read Lowes' Road to Xanadu, they would
surely have said, "You don't know the half of it." It would seem that, in one
way or another, the damaged archangel thought little of heisting large shipments of (preferably German) ore, which without acknowledgment he then
led his readers to believe that he, STC, had mined in a heroic assault on the
darkness of the lower depths.
One aim of Froman's large biographical essay is to show just how varied was
this borrowing, snatching, grabbing, remembering, copying, lifting and petty
theft. The story itself provides considerable entertainment. Its plot is: where
will the angel strike next? Because Fruman has a novelist's interest in the
psychology of Colcridgean kleptomania, he can carry us through the dismal
long terrain, in whose fearful passage the doomed poet/critic often approaches
madness. Throughout Fl1lman remains empathetic, if not sympathetic. There are
times when even his negative capability toward STC seems to have been strainedthe relations commonly thought to have existed between STC and Wordsworth
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he finds unfairly weighted, so as to hurt Wordsworth's reputation. It appears
to Fruman that Coleridge learned, that is, took, more from his austere friend
than critics have been wHIing to admit. And there arc times when, almost
abstractly, without regard to the hurt imposed on some unacknowledged
"source," Coleridgeal1 plagiarism seems to offend Fruman's moral sense. And
it offends his sense of history. Criticism relates closely to science, and in
science priority of discovery is a recognized achievement, since science assumes
the reality of material progress. From the scientific angle the question is interesting, _if not finally crucial. Simultaneity of scientific discovery suggests that
the determination of critical "originality" wiII be a tricky matter. Yet it
remains well worth studying.
The question of originality thus raised has, however, a dimension which
Norman Froman seems either to have dismissed for strategic reasons, or not
to have envisaged. In its more general fonn this dimension of the problem
may be stated as a question: if the critic lifts other critics' words, phrases and
paragraphs en bloc, without acknowledgement, in what way, precisely, does
that lifting detract from the critic's presumed originality? The question obviously
has two halves, neither of them very definitely circumscribed. On the one side
there is the lifting itself-what are we to say about it? Is .vhat is plagiarized
itself a sort of objet trouve, or is it "stolen property," and if the latter, does
the theft become significant because it violates the letter or the spirit of copyright law? And on the other side, how shall we define the nature of a critical
"originality? " The Damaged Archangel certainly provides much detail to indicate what kinds of things Coleridge would lift, the most famous of them being
the passage on Imagination in the Biographia Literaria, a direct steal from
Schelling, according to most authorities.
But the book does not ask that framing, double-edged question, and in this,
to be fair, the case against Coleridge is flawed. From The D({maged Archangel
one would never guess that our recent period has been one of acute, often rather
painful recognition that Coleridge, like other critical minds seeking a wider
. basis for criticism, was often working in areas beyond the confines of "academic
source studies." Such studies are usually underrated; they require great skill
and endless patience, with wide reading. Fruman would appear to be a masterful
source-hunter. Yet his lack of a theory of intellectual origins leaves his demonstration of certain or less than certain, but still probable, thefts settled perilously
on the edge of massive irrelevance. To repeat, it is not without interest or
importance for us to learn that Coleridge (or any other critic) has stolen this
or that from some prior worker. But in the case of Coleridge the critic himself
had already raised, in a hundred ways, the question as to what poetical and
intellectual originality really is. His manifest method of creating poems out of
a mosaic of his own reading already suggests part of the problem, namely that
he possibly (granting for the moment that Fruman's and W cliek's evidence holds
up, a matter on which only experts can judge), very possibly, located poetry
and criticism close to each other, and applied the same rules of composition
to the one as to the other. It is only after determining if and how this is or
is not so that one can then proceed to create the case in a strict evidential
demonstration.
To be quite brief about it, Coleridge probably took a "Renaissance" attitude
toward his thefts. While he may indeed have felt guilty about them, he found
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them necessary for his work, as Shakespeare found it necessary to take whole
speeches, not to mention story-lines, etc. from other authors. The example of
Shakespeare may have been impressive to Coleridge. Since he regarded the
Bard's work as practically "scientific," he may have assumed for himself a
license he well knew his model to have practised. The guilt that accompanied
the thefts belongs in part to STC's own extremely complex web of private fears
and anxieties, and at the same time could well be a product of an early 19thcentury rise in attention to the private, saleable property of authors. But the
guilt needs to be distinguished from the act itself, which could have reasons
of its own, based on a theory of invention closely resembling that of the Renaissance poets and critics, who rarely acknowledge each other's materials, while
taking them over and putting to new uses and displaying them in new settingsin translations, for example. This may be associated, as a theory of invention,
with Shakespeare, while it is opposed to the attitudes and behavior of Ben
Jonson, who remains a detennined minority voice, always willing (perhaps
because proud of his book-learning) to "acknowledge his sources."
One aspect of the Fruman inquest is particularly moving, in the light of this
problem of the theory of plagiarism. To his subject Fruman is stern, but
entirely (or ahnost entirely) forgiving. He is attempting to be understanding,
as Gertrude Stein would put it. This attempt gives this book a sense of search
for its own raison d'etre, for it follows that if STC was such a rank plagiarist,
as this indictment makes him appear, then we as critics are left wondering how
to relate to (a) the plagiarized material and (b) its plagiarist. Both relations to
the divine ldeptomane will be complex, and Fruman gives many, and many
times very expressive, examples of this complexity.

The first source of complication lies outside Coleridge himself, even outside
his work. It is the bias, the Anglo-Gennan rivalry, the general ignorance of
German materials which pervades the English literary scene, the tendency toward
isolationism along lines of national literature rather than European communityin short, the whole atmosphere under which debate about STC and his literary
relations must occur. A final estimate of his indebtedness to others will owe a
good deal, I should think, to the very open way in which Fruman has written
about the matter. His style reflects one kind of openness; it is full of personal
touches, and much of its length and breadth comes from a desire to give the
whole picture as the author sees it. Such an approach is inherently lively, and
in a way its particular triumphs and failures are far less important than the
example itself, which may help to clear the Coleridgean air by drawing our
attention to the possibility of bias in our judgments. To give only one instance
of a source of bias: it is difficult for English-speaking people, native-born to
the tongue of Shakespeare, to imagine that a foreign critic like A. W. Schlegel
might have earlier and more perfectly perceived certain great Shakespearean
qualities, and then articulated them with greater elegance than was managed
by the Bard's own countryman.
To sort out the failures of critics in seizing upon what he takes to be a
more accurate picture of STC (the dust-jacket has four remarkable portraits of
him, from youth to age), Fruman divides his book into three initial sections,
which are followed by a radical extension of perspective in a final fourth section,

BOOK REVIEWS

269

"Transfigured Night." Part I, "A Portrait in Mosaic," is an introductory tour
through certain typifying Coleridgean plagiarisms, with a strong biographical
coloration throughout. Poetry is the main issue here. Froman shows that STC
early acquired the habit of making people think he was wunderkind, a selfimage which slowly developed, according to Fruman, into a tenacious complex
form which Coleridge was never to escape. Part II deals largely with the
expository critical writings, among them Biographia Literaria, the never finished
"Opus Maximum," and the Shakespearean criticism. Here again Fruman documents what appear to be hundreds of thefts, large and small. Part III takes a
similar approach to the greater poetry, including the work of the remarkable
period when STC produced" The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," "Christabel,"
and" Kubla Khan."
Sections I to III will stand or fall, as I have suggested, on the degree to
which experts of German romantic criticism and of the other" original sources"
involved come to accept or reject Fruman's allegations as proved or not. The
point needs repetition: only experts can tell exactly how a particular "borrowing" feels to them in the context of a whole canon. And this sort of discussion,
provoked by the book, will be lively and useful and by no means ultimately
destructive to Coleridge, though immediately embarrassing. This is perhaps the
place to mention a most unfortunate lacuna in The Damaged Archangel. No
doubt for reasons of timing (date of publication, etc.) Fruman does not mention
McFarland's Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, a profoundly learned study
in German sources, a work written from that point of view yet colored throughout by an uncanny awareness of the Coleridgean mind and its reticulative method.
Other interesting and important recent books come to mind at this juncture:
it is too bad not to have had Fruman's reaction to Basil Willey's study of STC's
religious development, Owen Barfield's new study, Haven's book, and so on.
This vigorous publishing activity suggests the scope of present interest in
Coleridge, but it is hard to introduce others into a "big book" sometimes.
Richard Haven, at least, is an enlivening source for Fruman (the 1HZ article
on "Coleridge, Hartley, and the Mystics," dating back to 1959!), but his
recently published book on Coleridge is not referred to. We are reminded of
the unwieldy inefficiency of books of criticism-a problem of great interest to
STC himself-and can only regret that here, as so often, the pressures of time
and history prevented a confrontation between Fruman and McFarland. In that
case at least, I believe it was historically possible for Fruman to have known
McFarland's work. However, these decalages get sorted out in time (though
we do really need more discussion about the role of speed and timing in the
publication of ideas).
It is Part IV of The Damaged Archangel that, so to speak, exists by itself.
Humanly considered, it is the climactic portion of this biography of a mind.
The scene owes much to the magnificent scholarly work of Coburn, Griggs
and others who have gradually presented to us the Notebooks, the Letters,
and the endless bits and pieces of Coleridgean rumination and marginalian magic.
Fruman's chapter headings, "Themes," "Dreams," "The Unreconciled Opposites,"
"Shipwreck and Safe Harbor," tell much of the story. This part of the book
will be read with profit by every student of literature, since it strongly conveys
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the terror that beset Coleridge during most of his life and dragged him often
to the edge of insanity. With admirable coolness, Froman shows many details,
one of which, infinitely suggestive and more austere in its frpson than most,
comes in the record of a dream of December 6, 1803:
Adam travelling in his old age came to a set of the descendants of Cain,
ignorant of the origin of the world & treating him as a Madman killed
him. A Sort of Dream, which I had this night. (Quoted Damaged
Archangel, 379)
The interest of Froman's fourth section lies in its method. Thus, with the·
dream of the murder of Adam, he surrounds the quote with a revealing network
of associative materials, all of which help to explicate the dream, some subtly,
others grossly. In tins instance, for example, he notes that II the day b~ore
Coleridge had written a letter (perhaps in the hours just before going to sleep)
to one Matthew Coates; the letter deals primarily with his own projected
travels, following upon his decision to leave his wife and children to seek health
9.broad." (380) The movement of commentary is back and forth between dream
and the total verbal/physical scene in which the dream comes into b~ing as a
written object.
Once again a question of theory (or perhaps only orientation) arises: what
in principle is the relation between dream and reality, with an author of the
Coleridgean stamp? Froman does have a general view, to be sure, though it
rests in a curiously" classical" Freudianisr;n of biography. I have nothing against
the great master of mind, but it has to be said, over and over, that Coleridge
in part is difficult to understand because he was busy drawing out tlte complexities of mind that exist "over and above" a Freudian dynamic. The "over and
above" involves problems of perception (to which Patricia Ball has drawn
attention in her monograph, The Science of Aspects: The Changing Role of
Fact in ,be Work of Coleridge, Ruskin and Hopkins [London, 1971]), ·of metaphysics and semantics, and of certain literary concerns which circle about
Coleridge'S quite peculiar attitude toward Shakespeare.
Fruman has suggested. particularly in his illuminating pages on the poet's
unhappy youth, on the Coleridge/Wordsworth connection, as well as throughout The Damaged Archangel in lesser matters, that Coleridge never resolved
a basic problem of authority. On the one hand, according to this view, he
always wanted to be taken for more pure, more right, more genial than in [;lct
he was or could have been, he too being mortal and limited by space, time
and death. This wunderkind complex took deep root. Not only so, but deeper
roots went down from other quite private Coleridgean fears-can one imagine
a relation tenser or more problematic than that connecting Coleridge and the
two Wordsworths? The one-time "inspired charity boy" floated through life
on a sea of guilt, fearful of incestuous longings that arose from a more or less
cruel maternal upbringing and the sudden, Oedipally-freighted loss of his father
(over which Coleridge had. in effect, Freud's "dream of the death of the
beloved "). In handling such psychic history Froman is resolutely the classic
Freudian, admirably straight-forward, undeterred by more recent, largely European decorations of the Freudian dynamic of repression and i(S behavioral consequences. The following gives a sample of the classic lingo:

· pa~
·fillit
· the
· cleo
mea
.pe
.of,

"'"

.(th,

.. 'h«
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That the key role of horrible avenger is assigned to a demonic female
provides the necessary clue which links "The Ancient Mariner" and
" Christabel. ll If Coleridge's unconscious was roiled with oedipal or
fraternal guilts, it was nevertheless the cruel mother who meted out the
punishment, by banishment, by withdrawal of love. In all his subsequent
crippled relationships with women, it was not a wife his longing spirit
sought, but the sheltering love of the protective mother. [405 J

",rf
y,

There is some Jungian equipment here too, but the dynamic of Fruman's biography is a sympathetic, if perhaps not very subtle, use of Freud. But he does
well with a number of diagnostic commentaries on various dreams and their
place in the poet/critic's life. When he quotes a contemporary remark (it was
in fact Dr. Gillman's) that Coleridge "was scrupulously clean in his person,
and especially took great care of his hands by frequent ablutions," we are well
situated by the critical text to use the remark in a Freudian (i.e., genetic and
dynamic) search for the Coleridgean mind. Fruman is writing a psychobiography,
a work not totally unlike Bate's biographies of Johnson and Keats (and to a
lesser extent Bate's more modest and academic Coleridge). What always saves
this book for the reader as a formalist, perhaps as a "structuralist," certainly a;
an unwilling geneticist of the imagination, is the way Fruman simply fills his
pages with anecdote, aside, marginalia, slivers of poetry, in short with all the
fillings of a rich biographical cake. It is true, as Basil Willey recently remarked,
the time is not quite ripe for a gigantic opus maximum on Coleridge (though
clearly Willey felt that various giants might be lurking in the wings). In the
meantime, The Damaged Archangel is inherently satisfying to read as biography,
especially the "Transfigured Night" of STC's mental climate. The mere act
of collecting the dreams in one place and stressing them frontally is an important critical contribution, nicely illustrating the way in which technical innovation
(the publication of the Notebooks, in this case) leads to new possibilities of
theory and understanding.

The present reviewer has only the roughest notion of how he would approach
the Coleridgean life, let alone what is generally demanded by the exigencies
of the subject as a whole. But there are some revealing oddities in the fon11al
aspect of STC's production and life, which may be worth looking into more
deeply. For example, why is Venus and Adonis the central Shakespearean
instance of genius given in the Biograpbial Was Coleridge simply too lazy to
give a larger case, Hamlet or Tbe Tempest? Is it simply, as he says, that this
narrative poem shows how early real genius shows itself? Is that question, in
turn, related to something going on in the Biographia as personal testament
(however hastily and distractedly written)?
Increasingly critics of Coleridge have given more attention to his ideas of
U method."
Both Richard Haven and J. R. de J. Jackson have writt~n about the
relation between the theory of method and the Coleridgean performance. It
begins to seem that the form of the Biograpbia Lite1'Ctria is its most brilliant
invention. Perambulatory and wayward, this form suggests, among other things,
that when (ahnost alone among English critics of his time) Coleridge b2gan
to think seriously about method and wrote his Essays on Method, he had to
adopt the prefatory indirection which life itself tends to possess. Coleridge
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became systematically and deliberately wayward; he, like Hegel (on whom, in
this connection, the reader may consult ]. Derrida, De la Dissemination, "Hol'S

livre," pp. 1-66), began to pay his respects to the preliminary aspect of real
invention and insight.
In the same sense Coleridge may have been deliberately and systematically a
kleptomaniac. This is not quite a paradox. Like many obsessed persons, that
is, like many in the throes of the classical Freudian's "obsessional neurosis,"
Coleridge knew perfectly well what he was doing. This at least is the most
economic assumption to make. Obsession is the one neurosis we can, and do,
all live with; it is the basis, for example, of almost all difficult intellectual labor.
According to such a view, Coleridge would then continue to thrive, because
theft corresponded to his vast obsessive II method" of understanding the true
nature of literary" property." If a passage was worth quoting, as the Renaissance
humanists insisted, it was worth stealing. This "stealing" is personally tricky
for the thief, if it induces guilt; at the same time its secrecy gives him an
immediate access to parts of a verbal universe in which words, as such, are no
one's property. On such a view (though not in terms of the literary marketplace
and its copyright conventions), Coleridge had "a right to" anything said on
the subject of his idol, Shakespeare. This "right" followed from the suspended
belief that Shakespeare and the critique of Shakespeare were part of a larger
theoretical whole which no individual could "own" in any ordinary sense. There
is a sort of unique communism, a vague remnant of youthful pantisocratic hopes,
lingering in everything Coleridge later accomplished. And he was living in the
age of de facto property-enhancement. What is raised so well by Froman's
courageous book is the whole question of ownezship in the literary domain.
The theory of ownership is close to the theory of literary influence; both require
the kind of sympathetic analysis which, from various quarters, they are beginning
to get.
Furthermore, one emphasis, on guilt, is also an important directive for
Coleridgean studies (as his fond admirers have really always known). Fruman
has frankly approached this gnilt. But the experience of gnilt is not directly
related to the acts we perform. It is always involved in a refraction of a virtuous
desire to do the non-guilt-producing thing; in short, often those feel guilty who
have no clear, direct reason for their feeling of guilt. In the case of Coleridge
one senses sometimes that he accepted anxiety and guilt as a catalytic condition
of his genius. He worked the fields of guilt. Coleridge happy, in a down-home
way, is inconceivable, because he refused to entertain the idea. His identification
with Hamlet is the structural principle of his life. No wonder he thought he
owned Schlegel et alf
To get at the structural relation berween the Coleridgean theft and the form
of his writing and thought, we shall have to envisage the "methodical" shape
of the "literary life," as he conceived it. This speculation has scarcely been
attempted as yet, though Jackson has written a book on Coleridge and method
that places us inside the periphery of the problem. The key to a further advance
seems to me to be a flexible, unacademic study of Coleridge and the idea of
religion. Both McFarland and Willey, in major texts, and many others in
detailed articles and monographs, have begun to provide the technical equipment
for snch a study.
For the problem of authority, with Coleridge as with most metaphysically
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inclined persons, comes down to a relation between the self and the religious
life. He is at once in a complex situation, since criticism, on his own view,
was a kind of science, whereas his own leanings were toward numinous explanation. That Coleridge was not alone in feeling the tug between critical and
religious thought is apparent in the work of all subsequent 19th centUlY English
critics, perhaps most memorably in Matthew Arnold, but in fact across the
board. A triadic sequence of questions becomes the issue: criticism (a science)poetry (an action)-religion (a belief): requiring to be interrelated as they arc
by the H literary life." Without making this triadic analysis it will appear, as
unfortunately Fruman's book makes it seem, that Coleridge's brain evaporated
some time soon after 1820, if not before. Nothing could be further from the
truth. His later writing is as brilliant and moving as anything he produccd. It
is, however, based on the religious side of the triad, and this aspcct of things is
less accessible to most of us.
Every critic of Coleridge will have a preferred mode of approach to his
many-sided mind. One approach that has been inadequately explored is the
question of Shakespeare's importance to his worshipper. To my knowledge no
critic has shown why, when commenting on the theory of the Bible and its
vast exploratory fonn (in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit), Coleridge is led
to speak of Shakespeare. A returning obsession? Nor, more important to begin
with, what is -the role of this "Shakespeare" in the Biograpbia, the Essays on
Method, and the desultory, troubled lectures which seem, from our vcrbatimnote remnants, to have been a wcird, semi-private monologue on the "true
meaning" of the Bard's existence. (See, for these, R. A. Foakes' new edition
of the 1811-12 lectures, Coleridge on Shakespeare, which is furthennore a monograph on that interesting man, J. P. Collier). Shakespeare is the central, structuring, leading, guiding light and heat (however one wants to imagine the
process) and finally also a comforting mask in the Coleridgean dream.
Admitting that we are in the midst of a debate, we can say perhaps that
Shakespeare provided for Coleridge the model for thinking about "method."
Although "method" is a sign of the coming of the modern world, insofar as
it defines the Renaissance attitude toward the connection of time and thought,
\vhen Coleridge found that he too responded to the problem of method, he also
found that his Shakespearean inheritance could enrich and clarify the response.
He must have felt that his philosophical raids on Germany, besides giving him
a newly thing-filled philosophic diction (the German agglutinative semantic),
gave him also a sense of the rightness of his belief in Shakespeare. For if it was
"religious," it had to be "right," since religion is a matter, not of exterior proof,
but of faith. As the domain of implicit coherence, religion communized the
ownership of any ideas that would support the belief in Shakespeare. To suggest
that Schlegel or Schelling (the latter on Imagination) was a "source" might
well violate the sense of mysteries, which requires a mute recognition of what
Freud said his informants called the "oceanic" aspect of religion. (Which of
course puzzled the terrene Freud no end.) One can imagine a Coleridgean
rumination going somewhat like this: "I have slowly discovered that my
, philosophy' is a deviation from a fantastic, imaginative literature in which
metaphysics are always implicit. Philosophy can only be the hidden dimension,
the tacit dimension, of a great literature that has religious force. Open it out
(as you must with philosophic devices of a technical nature, i.e., the specific
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words or terms of Schlegel or some other), and you will kill its mystery. In
fact I began to think this way when I met Wordsworth, for whom philosophy
is an art of poetic implication. At that time too Dorothy vVordsworth showed
me the implicit structure of the landscape, which I could then contemplate in
its living line, as if I could live the line of the mountain ridges. Writing my
own better poems, on supernatural subjects of great terror, I found that for me
method could never be explicit. It had to reside in the act, as its buried but
constant life. 'l\'.lechanical' and 'organic' were then merely names for something which the Wordsworths taught me to recognize, and because a recognition
had already occurred with them, there was scarcely a chance that I could or
should acknowledge any 'sources' in anyone else. I could only acknowledge
other mutual recognitions, and they already belonged to the realm of common understanding. Those who seek my sources must not forget my life."
Such imaginary monologues are nothing, compared with history. If one
approach to a history of Coleridge'S troubled life is to find, aided by the increasing bulk of published Coleridgeana, what happened to him as he went along,
another will be to speculate on his own utterances about history and the social
life of man, an increasing preoccupation as he grew older and survived. Another
method will be to return to the great poems, adding to them certain lesser poems
of great technical bravura. Basic to a finer grasp of the whole life will be a
close acquaintance with the Coleridge/Wordsworth bond. And above all, the
Coleridge/Shakespeare connection. This last, as its student soon discovers, leads
to a large and difficult field of study: the role of philosophy in English letters
(e.g., why so different from France and Gennany, in this respect?).
]\,Tonnan Fruman has, I think, done a lot to get such questions into a wider
domain than any previous author of our time, except Dr. Richards. Fruman has
done this simply by being interested in Coleridge the man. About most human,
personal, character-judgments there will be some argument, and Fruman will
find those who don't like his portrait at all. But the overall effect is strong
and useful, since implicit in The Damaged Archangel is a systematic awareness
that whatever is literary in Coleridge is importantly touched by a biographia
of some kind. Fruman is often stiff-he belongs to the great tradition of puritan
biographers-but he is not a fanatic. He has wonderful notes, like most, but
not all, devoted Coleridgeans, and they fill about 130 pages of his book. And he
has an expansiveness which goes with his roughness. Every so often the pathos
of STC's life, which is so very difficult to describe convincingly, or sometimes
even to believe in (writers are driven to speaking about his "terrifying" dreams,
nightmares, drug symptoms, etc.), and the finally absolute quality of Coleridge's
physical survival at Highgate, in Malta, in the Lake Country, everywhere, come
across in Fruman's account with their true Wordsworthian austerity. Close to
the end of The Damaged Archangel Fruman has occasion to summarize the
poet's familial history:
Hartley [Coleridge'S son and the" dear babe" of "Frost at Midnight,"
a born genius, for whom the poet said he. dreamed so much good] was
thirty-eight years old when his father died. In all those thirty-eight
years he did not live in his father's presence for as much as five years.
Coleridge's brilliant daughter, Sara, who was to do so much for his
after-fame, did not see him once between her tenth and twentieth years.
(432)
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in
One final reversal of position: I may have suggested, in commenting adversely
lYon the lack of a theory of originality and literary theft, that Nonnan Froman is
;d
insensitive to what he himself once calls the "quintessentiilly Coleridgean."
That would be a harsh, stupid judgment. The very first line of this book breathes
the atmosphere of being in the Colcridgean presence. In the inevitably twisting,
over-played, critically garrulous search for the final identity of the Involuntary
Imposter, Fruman has himself entered the path of Coleridgean method. In this
path the mind, as he says, "turns to origins." (331) The Damaged Archangel
lives its own life, full of its own sense of self-discovery. This may be inefficient,
and it seems to accompany what will be called a philosophic and psychoanalytic
naivete, but it is a very Coleridgean production. Thus, although the book leaves
a great deal to be unearthed, understood and formulated, and though perhaps
it imagines itself as conquering more territory than it actually holds, it is still
tremendously readable. Through its stress on the poet/critic's dreams it is
critically innovative. There is a kind of bluff commonsense that breathes fresh
air into a heavy ambience.
One wonders, of course, what Coleridge would say about all our recent
interest in him. Perhaps we should be to him as Keats was, when they met
one afternoon in the street. Coleridge was walking along slowly, at his alderman's pace, with another man. Keats observed that STC was caught in the
stream of his own monologue, and as the two parted, the older man's voice
could be heard disappearing in the distance, leaving behind it the fragments of
an endless recital of an infinite blueprint of mental stimuli. What are we, then,
to such a man?

's

ANGUS FLETCHER

SUNY Buffalo

The Philosophy of Art by Giovanni Gentile, translated by Giovanni Gullace.
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. c + 292. $15.00.

I

One of the more important parts of The Philosophy of Art is Gentile's logically rigorous enquiry into the experiential relationship between poetry and
criticism. Italian thought concerning this relationship was much the same in
1931, when Gentile first published his book, as American thought was thirty
years later, when Murray Krieger looked back upon the problems of the new
apologists for poetry. For both Benedetto Croce, whose thought dominated
Italian aesthetics through the first third of the century, and the New Critics, the
difficulties of this relationship stemmed from their special sense of the radical
difference between poetry and criticism. For both, poetry was thought to be a
seamless unity, an autonomous organism, a fusion of intuition and expression,
whereas criticism was viewed as analytical, intellectual, a practical endeavor
whose objective lies outside itself in the wholeness of poetry.
According to the profoundest understanding of the New Critical position, that
of Eliseo Vivas, in the experience of a poem the reader ceases to be himself
and becomes the poem; aesthetic attention, intransitive attention, is selfless; one
sees with the eyes of the poem, one is the being of the poem. Criticism, which

276

BOOK REVIEWS

necessarily follows the aesthetic experience, is reiiective; it is the effort to point
out those elements in one's experience of the poem which are most important
to it as an aesthetic experience, for the purpose of helping others work to the
point of losing themselves in the poem, of becoming the poem. The drastic
limitation of all criticism, viewed in this way, is that the critic can say nothing
about the poem as a whole, as a totality, because in experiencing the poem he
in fact became that whole, he was utterly identical with it. His acutest awareness, in other words, was indistinguishable from the awareness of the poem.
Afterwards, he could talk about what he had been aware of, hut not about his
awareness, because it is essential to aesthetic experience that we not be aware
of such awareness, since self-consciousness would violate the wholeness of
intransitive attention. Since the critic's awareness in the aesthetic experience is
identical with the totality of the poem, in not being able to speak critically about
his awareness, he is incapable of speaking about the totality of the poem. He
mnst limit his speech to the parts of the poem, mowing that in the aesthetic
experience these parts had no distinct being apart from the entire poem as a
seamless, organic whole. Such a predicament collapses criticism based upon a
sense of the organic unity of poetry into criticism as paraphrase, a procedure
based on a sense of the poem as the sum of its separable parts. It is true that
as Empson atomizes a poem, he insists that his sense of multiplicity is governed
by a taste left in the head from the aesthetic experience, and it is true that his
best analyses suggest some ineffable feeling as their source. It is also true that
Cleanth Brooks often refers an item discussed to the unruscussable "dramatic
totality" of the poem under consideration. On the basis of what is actually
articulated in such analyses, however, the New Criticism can be distinguished
from conventional paraphrase only as being unhappy with itself, aware of its
inadequacy, and longing to be other than itself.
So unhappy and anxious a situation could not endure, and the tensed bow
snapped into two slack fragments, one dualistic, the other monistic. Northrop
Frye adopted a positivistic dualism, content with intricate analyses umelated to
aesthetic experience. For Frye, an abyss as wide as that between plum and
botanist or physical event and physicist separates poem and critic. The critic can
say nothing about the poem as experienced; his responsibility is not to poems as
read, but rather to the autonomous discipline of criticism. As a critic, Frye is
cut off from poetry but not distressed by this as the New Critics were. Equally
free critical spirits are legion today, many following Frye, others adopting structuralist techniques, others modelling themselves on Heidegger's use of Holderlin
to picture forth his own mind's desire, and still other.; imitating the autonomous
criticism of Leslie Fiedler.
In contrast to such dualistic criticism, other critics strive to write criticism
directly out of their absolute identity with the poem in the aesthetic experience.
As the criticism of Maurice Blanchot most strikingly manifests, the aim of these
critics is to write criticism which is not detached from the poetry,-or for that
matter even about the poetry-but fundamentally at one with the poetry. At
bottom, their effort is to write criticism in such a way that its author will be
the poem of its concern. Such criticism is as autonomous as Frye's, not because
it is umelated to poetry, but rather because it is indistinguishable from poetry.
Although such visionary or orgiastic monism avoids the pains of the New
Criticism as effectively as Frye's positivistic dualism does, the point of it all
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seems no less dubious than the value of Frye's criticism. We desire the truth
about beauty, not truth about nothing or beauty about beauty. Both radical
dualism and radical monism seem to evade the difficulties of the New Criticism
by ceasing to be criticism in any serious sense at all.
When Gentile came to write The Philosophy of Art, Italian thought about
the relationship between poetry and criticism was not in so hopeless a predicament as that of the New Criticism and its remnants. For thirty years Croce
had been striving to reconcile the dualistic and monistic aspects of the relationship. His maturest resolution of the problem is based upon a tripartite conception of criticism as taste, judgment, and characterization. Initially the critic must
become the poem, experiencing it as an intuition-expression "from the point
of view)) of the poet. Taste and genius are identical. This first moment of
criticism, however, is virtually inarticulate; its conclusion can be no more than
"Eureka" or "ugh" or a blend of the two. The second, judgmental moment
of criticism detennines the categorical being of the first moment: it judges the
experience to have been aesthetic, unaesthetic, or a mixture of the two. The
third moment is a practical, approximate characterization of the uniqueness of
the judged experience. It is meant to synthesize the first MO moments of
criticism, the moment in which one is aesthetically identical with the poem and
the moment in which one is judgmentally detached from the poem. Experientially, Croce's analysis seems to work out the problems which broke the New
Criticism and which have been simply evaded by its followers. Unfortunately,
however, his analysis depends on three unexamined and unjustified dogmas: the
poem experienced is the poem; the poem judged is the poem experienced; and
the poem characterized is the poem as experienced and judged. Croce never
explicated the relations among the three moments of criticism; they are simply
strung out as distinct; their unity is uncritically assumed to be a "synthesis."
Not only his philosophy of art but the whole of Gentile's philosophy of
Actualism was de'dicated to an enquiry into the nature of the unity of human
experience on the basis of which he could articulate its necessary inner relationships. As early as 1912, Gentile was evolving his concept of Actualism as a
philosophy without presuppositions or dogmas. All depends for him on the
incontrovertible truth and reality of "my present act of thinking." The proposition, "I am thinking," and only this proposition, cannot be denied or even
questioned without its being affirmed, since to deny and to question are acts of
thinking. "My present act of thinking" differs markedly from the phenomenological "consciousness of something," with its "of" being the relationship
of "intentionality" and its every "something" an "intended object." Gentile
recognizes that to be conscious is to be self-conscious, that to know something
requires that one knows that he knows something. As Collingwood observed,
even etymologically, "con-scious" implies this double awareness. As a result,
in the very act of thinking one can attend not only to his U I" and its "object,"
but also to the way in which they are related. Gentile need not posit a necessary "intentionality" which cannot be attended to experientially, with the consequence, as in Husserl, that all attention slides inexorably away from "intentionality" to the" intended object." "My present act of thinking" is for Gentile
a mediate act in which one thinks through the way self and not-self are related
just as fully as he thinks through self and not-self. Instead of the relation
between transcendental Ego and Object being merely necessary, like "Inten-
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tionality," that relation for Gentile is both necessary and actual. Because all
consciousness involves seH-consciousness, the relation between "ego" and "ob~
jeet" is experientially open to inspection.

Even for Gentile, however, the relation proved extremely difficult to attend
Prior to The Philosophy of Art, his dialectical concept of the act of thinking
tended to collapse into' two tenns only, my thinking an object and that object
as though~ 50 that the immediate I, the thesis, and the mediate I, the synthesis,
fell into an immediate identity. Thus; an enquiry into what might seem' to be
subjectively immediate, like "sensation" or "intuition," reveals that in truth
they are mediate. Just so, the immediate I becomes the mediate I; artd art
becomes philosophy, immediate intuition-expression becomes in its truth rela...
tiona! thinking.
The real problem~ then, for Gentile in The Phi/(}sophy of Art was not how
to relate poetry and criticism, but how to tell them apart. The essence of art
is the I in its immediacy, my most immediate sense of experience. Bur to exist,
this immediacy must break into its antithesis, the non-I, and to be actual both
immediate thesis and objective antithesis must be included within the synthetic act
of my thinking. But criticism, the act of thinking through the uniqueness of a
poem, also contains the" very same" three moments as the poem does. To be existent
and actual, both poetry and criticism must be both poetic and critical. In
avoiding dogmatic presuppositions and in making both poetry and criticism
experientially significant and logically necessary, Gentile seems to have barred
himself from making a distinction between poetry and criticism. Only in The
Philosophy of Art does he overcome this weakness. He does so by rejecting
Croce's notion of art as intuition for the notion of the essence of art as pure
feeling. The strength of this· change lies in the fact that feeling, nnlike intuition,
remains feeling even when its dialectical implications are fully explored. In
nonnal usage, feeling involves three" aspects: an innennost sense of experience;
the feel of things, the way things feel when touched or felt; and the prehensive
act of feeling, of touching or reaching out for something. A poem", then, even
though it includes all three moments of the dialeerical act of thinking, just as
criticism does, differs from criticism by being dominated by feeling, by h.ving
feeling, the first moment of the dialectic, as its essence. Criticism, even though
it must include the moment of feeling if it is to be in touch with the poem of
its concern, is essentially not feeling, but thinking. The critic concentrates not
on the poem as essence or the poem as" object, but on the thoughtful act of
feeling in which the poet strives to make the feel of things adequate to his
innennost feeling. The critic's objective is to make what is impassioned lucid,
to clarify the act of feeling so that it can be more fully experienced as the act
it is, unlike any other .ct of feeling. If he finds that the poet lapses into
abstraction or relational thinking, that he could not integrate feeling as immediate
and the feel of things, then his characterization will include" this finding as an
adverse judgment.
Thus, retaining Croce's three moments of criticism in the modified fonn of a
single act" of feeling, characterization, and judgment, Gentile relates them in a
logically rigorous way, as Croce could not, and also relates criticism and poetry
as a concordia discors, an identity of opposites. Poetry and criticism are identical
because containing the same three moments; they are different because poetry
is dominated by one of those moments, criticiSm by another.
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The main limitation of Gentile's enquiry into the relationship between poetry
and criticism is that he does not consider how one distinguishes between a
critical reading which attends to the individual nature of a poem in action and
a critical reading which makes the poem up as it goes along according to the
innermost feeling of the critic. In his earlier thought, when he still agreed with
Croce that a poem is an intuition-expression, Gentile indeed claimed that a poem
is a new poem with each new reading, so that his own criticism tended to be
as irresponsible as that of Heidegger. Although Croce could not justify it
philosophically, he always insisted that criticism can and must be faithful to the
poem as written. In The Philosophy of Art, Gentile recognizes that a poem
is not identical with its critical readings, that there is a difference as well as an
identity between poetry and criticism. But he does not face the question of
what it is in the finest criticism that ensures that its poetic subject will be recognized as an act distinct from itself as a critical act. Gentile's failure to account for
the continuing identity of a poem in multiple readings is the main reason for his
being neglected by contemporary Italian aestheticians.
It seems to me, however, that The Philosophy of Art at least suggests a way
of overcoming this limitation. M a critic reads and att:ends to and articulates
his sense of the individual articulation of the feeling of a poem, must he not be
most attentive to the way in which the poet listens critically to his own articulation of feeling? The critic need not and should not be the only listener in
his act of criticism. Indeed, if he is to treat the poem as an act and attend to
its full actuality, his final responsibility is to articulate his sense of the difference
between the poet's critical attention and his own. Thus, as he recreates and
judges the poem, he must evoke a sense of the otherness of the poem as act
from his own critical act and suggest the difference between the feeling dominating the poem and the feeling that moves him in his criticism. As a result,
he would find that as he judges the poem, he is granting it the_ capacity to judge
him. The difference between the poet's attentiveness and the critic's would, it
is true, depend on the critic's present sense of it. But by pushing his attention
to the point of eliciting the duality of attention involved in his criticism of the
poem, he would free the poem, or at least move it to the verge of being free,
for further readings by critics more perceptive than he is. Drawing this suggestion out may seem to tip the balance of Gentile's position from a dialectical unity
containing duality to a dialectic whose unity is fundamentally dualistic. But if
one considers Gentile's last book, the Genesis and Structure of Society (translated by H. S. Harris), it will be clear that he was moving in just that direction.
Such a tendency is at least implicit, I believe, in The Philosophy of Art.
MERLE

University of Iowa

E.

BROWN
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The" Encyclopedie" by John Lough. New York: David McKay Co., 1971.
Pp. xii + 430. $10.00.
Usually the best introduction to a scholarly or a literary work is a reading
of the work itself. Commentaries should come afterwards. But in the case of
the great French eighteenth-century Encyclopedie, this is not sensible advice.
Anyone today who simply tries to read it will be confused without being enlightened. The seventeen folio letterpress volumes and the eleven folio volumes
of plates contain about 72,000 entries and about 2,900 engravings, an embarrassment of riches. The parts vary in quality: some are masterpieces; others are
muddled, misinfonned, too terse, or almost endless. Moreover, contradictions
abound. The hundreds of collaborators sometimes differed in their ideas, and
the editors, Diderot and d'Alembert, did not try to impose unifonnity. There
are, for example, articles on religion favorable to Catholicism, Protestantism, deism,
scepticism, or atheism, articles on economics promoting governmental intervention and others arguing for governmental restraint. The reader needs guidance.
A scholar excellently qualified to supply such help is John Lough, Professor
of French at the University of Durham, England. He has a sure grasp of the
history of the Old Regime in general: his Introduction to Seventeenth Century
France (Rev. ed., 1969) and his Introduction to Eighteenth Century France (1960)
are two of the best surveys of those periods. Also, for some thirty years he has
written about the Encyclopedie. Many of his studies have recently been collected in Essays on the" Encyclopedie" of Diderot and d'Alembert (1968) and
The '( Encyclopedie" in Eighteenth-Century England and Other Studies (1970).
They reveal, an admirable familiarity with the work, the result of immense
research, a critical reading of sources, and balanced judgment.
His new book is his most ambitious. It is the first long general study of the
EncyclopMie to appear in English. The three begioniog chapters--;;ixty pages
in length-are mainly about the history of the enterprise. Limitations of space
make it impossible for Professor Lough to tell this complicated and absorbing
story in as detailed and dramatic a way as Arthur M. Wilson has done in his
superb scholarly biography of Diderot; but Lough's discussion has virtues of its
own. On the early history of the Encyclopedie, on its subscribers, and on its
various editions he is the authority in the field; and we now have a handy
summary of his conclusions. Concerning the work's immediate predecessors and
ir..<; contributors, too little is as yet known for any scholar to be more than suggestive, but Professor Lough makes some valuable remarks. For instance, he calls
attention to the fact that not all of the early general encyclopedias were shorter
than the Encyclopedie and that one of them, Zedler's Grosses vollstiindiges
Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und J{iinste, was a massive work which
deserves to be examined as a noteworthy predecessor of the Encyclopedie.
The main part of Professor Lough's study consists of six chapters-over 300
pages in length-on the contents of the work in relation to the thought of the
time. Here he is selective. He deals little with the EncycIopedie as a reference
book; and if the reader wants additional knowledge about its treattnent of history, literature, or the natural sciences, he should supplement Lough's account
with infonnation from two French surveys of the Encyclopedie-Pierre Grosclaude's Un audacieux message: I'Encyclopedie (1951) and especially Jacques
Proust's L'Encyclopedie (1965).
What Professor Lough chooses to stress is
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the most radical ideas of the Ency clopedie on philosophical, religious, political,
social, and economic matters, and how these differed from the orthodox thought
of many contemporary critics. Never before has this been done so comprehensively. Thanks to Jacques Proust's Diderot et l'Encyclopedie (2nd ed., 1967),
we know what ideas the chief editor contributed on such topics as Christianity,
absolute monarchy, and mercantilism. Now thanks to Professor Lough we can
compare all this to the articles of d'Alembert, d'Hoibach, Jaucourt, Naigeon,
Saint-Lambert, and other collaborators.
Professor Lough's conclusion is not startling, but it is sound. The Encyclopedie,
restrained by repressive authorities, was less bold than the boldest writings of
Diderot or Voltaire. Some of its views were in fact very conservative. Nevertheless, judged as a product of the 1750's and 1760's, of the era of Madame de
Pompadour, it was a II rallying point for men of progressive ideas," and the
orthodox rightly saw it as a threat to the status quo in France-to Catholicism,
to absolute monarchy, and to many current economic and social practices. "Here
was a work which breathed a new spirit, one which was hostile to tradition
and authority, which sought to subject all beliefs and institutions to a searching
examination." One might add that this anti-establishment position was combined
with a respect for learning, a reliance on reason, and a manner of expression
frequently designed to minimize offense rather than to shock or to confront.
Professor Lough's book is not easy to read. He discusses the ideas of a good
number of Encyclopedists on numerous topics, sometimes in a seriated fashion.
Also, there are so many long quotations in French that the book often resembles
an anthology with running commentaries. This is intentional. Professor Lough,
as he says in his preface, thinks that long quotations from the Encyclopedists
and from their contemporary critics provide the reader with "a firsthand view
of the outlook of the contributors" and allow one "to understand the true
meaning of many of the articles in their eighteenth-century context." Like the
Encyclopedie itself, this book is full of useful infotmation and 'thoughtful observation, deserving and demanding careful study.
FRANK

A.

KAFKER

University of Cincinnati

I

A Kingdom for a Stage: The Achievement of Shakespeare's History Plays by
Robert Ornstein. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp.
xii + 231. $11.00.
Neither their popularity in the age in which they were written nor the fact
that they represent roughly a third of his canon has encouraged a critical interest
in the history plays of our most talented playwright. While Professor Ornstein
in his book on the subject points out that II in the past several decades" the
history plays have been "rescued" from "relative neglect," the rescue, like
the neglect, has been just that-relative. The examples he cites, moreover, underscore his observation that "though appreciation of the History Plays is greater
now than it ever was before, so too perhaps is awareness of their flaws and
imperfections." The subtitle of his own book announces clearly that his emphasis,
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on the other hand, will be on the achievement of these plays. It has been some
time since we have had a book from Professor Ornstein, but the publication of
A Kingdom for a Stage assures us that the interval was well spent. The
achievement of his own literary judgment is noteworthy, even when evaluated
by the kind of criteria that one ought to apply to a critic, as Titania would
put it, "of no mean rate."
Yet, just as the history plays of an artist even of the first rank will naturally
vary, so will the individual comments of a critic of Mr. Ornstein's staturcand this is no damning by faint praise, for he consistently offers that which is
worthy of consideration. When one has reservations or disagreements with him,
it probably reflects more the tendency of Shakespeareans, even more than other
critics, to judge harshly any work that does not fall within the province (or
is it " provinciality "?) of their own enlightened view.
Surely among the most excellent sections of the first-rate book is his opening
one on "The Artist as Historian," in which he argues not only that Shakespeare's
history plays "are so different . . . from one another that it is difficult to
generalize about their subject matter, much less about their dramatic and poetic
qualities," but also that the plays are more experimental and daring in both
structure and theme than are his comedies. Still even his own convincing argument does not blind him either to the links between the plays or to the chronological development of Shakespeare's art in the genre.
The chapter on Richard III is also one of his stronger chapters. Here he
stresses the central issue as focusing upon Richard's being "better equipped to
seize the crown than to wear it." It is in this same excellent chapter that he
brilliantly argues for peripetia as more structural than peripheral.
Perhaps what one views as the weaker sections of the book again depends
on the reviewer's own limited interest and perspectives. I, for example, found
that my preference for King John made me see Shakespeare as more than bored
with his task of writing, and the play's" poetry, characterization, and plotting"
as more than merely "pedestrian" and "primitive." Perhaps this disagreement
made me more conscious of the fact that at this point Mr. Ornstein seemed to
be answering Tillyard and Miss Campbell more than those more recent critics
who had come to the rescue of the neglected genre. I even wondered whether
or not Mr. Ornstein had read the rather impressive introduction to the Signet
edition of the play by William H. Matchett, that argues with far more development and acumen for Philip the Bastard as protagonist than any of the critics
he chooses to refute. Of course, some of what Mr. OTIlStein sees as "new" or
" needed" in this and other chapters derives not only from answering older
books, but also from the admirable dedication and enthusiasm of a critic for his
~tt

My bias .also leads me to see his chapter on Richard 11 as of far more importance than that on tile Henry VI plays, perhaps because I find them far more
boring than King John, let alone Richard ll. In this last play, Mr. Ornstein sees
not Tillyard's Elizabethan World Picture of Cosmic Order, but instead a dramatization of Shakespeare's" awareness of man's will to discover pattern and stability
in a universe of disorder and flux." His development of such an inclusive view
of what Artistotle may have meant by Unity of Action, allows him, I believe, a
richer reading of the play than most less flexible readings.
A similarly inclusive reading of Henry V causes him to view the King neither
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as simplistically MachiaveI nor Ideal Prince, but as a man and King, who compares and contrasts with, teaches and learns from, an old fat knight, his rival,
and his father, about the relationship of the public and the private man. The
reading includes within it, for example, standard notions about different kinds
of honor. While others have seen the significance of this central conflict, few
have done so, so fully. The fact that Mr. Ornstein sees this same public vs.
private man as central to Richard 1I as well attests not to his having mounted any
thematic hobby horse. This becomes clear as he notes instead, the implications
of a theme that undeniably provides a major focus in both plays.
Though there is no single theme dwelt on by Professor Ornstein (as if searching for a unity for the book in which he sees the plays as so individual) there
is one element that does distinguish his work-his almost Delphic sense of balance. Thus while his forte is clearly that of the critic, he is repeatedly aware
that a knowledge of performance and scholarship are among his necessary critical
tools. When he speaks of Hal in Il Henry IV, for example, he adds a note that
reveals his eye for perfonnance: "Of course an actor playing Hal can with a
suppressed sob or two and gestures of silent grief present a Prince overwhelmed
with sorrow." When he writes of Henry VIII, his understanding of the scholarship concerning the possible collaboration with Fletcher, leads him to focus on
their individualistic recurring themes rather than on style and authorship merely
as an end. When he surveys the past criticism of a play, he does so with an
astuteness that questions even as it presents. For example, he demonstrates clearly
and fully, I think, that we have too lazily accepted the view of that list of
critics who see the disease imagery of II Henry IV as pervasive and incurable.
When he reviews the criticism on Richard Il, it is his questioning again that
leads him and us to see in the play that "paradoxically, it is the would-be preservers of the status quo who become the agents of revolutionary change." When
he speaks of the criticism which views the Ideal King as God's deputy, he notes
with a balance that God is also usually an afterthought for Henry. While he
is aware of pervasive Elizabethan attitudes that may have contributed to the
shaping of Shakespeare's art, he is also balanced enough to observe that geniuses
do not always share common attitudes. Although he is aware that Shakespeare
is not our contemporary, his balance, like that of Ben Jonson, allows him to
realize that Shakespeare wrote not only for his age, but for all time. Even when
he repeatedly points to what he conceives to be a misplaced critical hypothesis
or an improper emphasis in the work of TiIIyard and Miss Campbell, it does
not prevent him from appreciating what he has learned from them and from
building upon their work. His criticism, then, is not merely iconoclastic. Like
the history plays he criticizes, it is creative as well.
PHILIP TRACI

Wayne State University
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A Variorum Commentary on the Poems of John Milton, Volume Two, The
Minor English Poems. Ed. A. S. P. Woodhouse and Douglas Bush, with a
Review of Studies of Verse Fonn, by Edward R. Weismiller. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972. Part One: pp. xvii + 338. $15.00. Part Two:
pp. xi + 339-734. $15.00. Part Three: pp. xi + 735-1143. $15.00.
One of the qualities most imperative in a variorum edition is that the infonnation (and speculation) therein compiled should be clearly and accurately presented. These volumes splendidly obey this imperative. In carrying through to
completion Professor Woodhouse's work, left unfinished at his untimely death
in 1964, Professor Bush has perfonned a fitting tribute to his life-long friend;
and ODe may add that these volumes are in turn a tribute to Professor Bush's
unremitting and unstinting industry. Doubtless there are inaccuracies and misprints, but doubtless they are very hard to .find-indeed, for this reviewer, and
up to this point, impossible.
The clarity in the arrangement of material is occasionally reduced by unavoidable necessities-for example, the editorial decision to take the minor poems in
the non-chronological order of the Columbia edition, which followed the order
of Poems (1673), so that one. must remember that Part Two is devoted to
Lycidas (and the sonnets), whereas Part Three is devoted to the earlier Comus
(and the psahns, plus WeismilIer's review of studies of verse fonn). And
throughout, Bush sets himself the constant problem of preserving as much as
possible of Woodhouse's text, which was left in widely-varying stages of completion. Hence the reader must become accustomed to the recurring use of
square brackets, indicating Bush's additions, illustrations, comments, and occa-

sional disagreements-bracketing sometimes single sentences, sometimes paragraphs, sometimes many pages, or even whole sections, as indicated by a
bracketed [D.B.] after the section heading. But the user of these volumes will
soon become accustomed to these procedures, and will be grateful for such
clarifying details as the complete avoidance of appendices, the continuous pagination, the provision of a new (and less cryptic) set of abbreviations for individual titles to replace those in the Columbia Works, and for the relatively
uncluttered Bibliogtaphical Index (III.1089-1143), prepared with an eye to its
usefulness, not its impressiveness.
Presumably the other chief imperative for a variorum is that it should ttnly
reflect the variety of existing commentary on its subject. It is true that comprehensiveness leads inevitably to the recording of ill-informed guesses and illgrounded objections that one wishes might be left to die of exposure on the
mountainside. But these editors, although predictably they choose U to err on
the side of. inclusiveness" (I.x) , are well aware of the unevenness of the mate~
rials they include, and are willing to be specific about the false premises, blind
alleys, and red herrings that sometimes adorn their pages. One may begin to
think dark thoughts while perusing the twenty pages (!) devoted to .. that twohanded engine" (II.686-706), but at least the editors are able to distinguish "two~
handed" from "double-edged", and it is somehow comforting to note Professor
Woodhouse's irritation with those who run the two together. On the whole,
one concludes that a novice student may be puzzled, but not really hanned, by
wandering through the blind mazes of this tangled wood, accompanied by edi-
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Professor Weismiller's review of studies of verse fonn (111.1007-1087) will be
vastly supplemented by his line-by-line annotations of prosody and related
matters, including pronunciation, to comprise Volume Six in the series. To one
not expert in these perilous waves, his review appears balanced and comprehensible-the latter no mean virtue when the talk begins to center on prosody.
One is pleased at the judicious recognition of achievements as various as those
of Robert Bridges and F. T. Prince, and a bit disappointed that the New Grammarians have not yet given Professor Weismiller anything to review-but the
disappointment cannot be directed at him.
RALPH NASH

Wayne State University

nd'
id·
in,
lu
to

~I

,.~i·I'

~I
~:I

:Iy!

i'l

"Y:
[Co!
m·I'
he
on
teo

nd

..
or
to

,I~

by
di·

The Lyrics of Shelley by Judith Chernaik. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve
University Press, 1972. Pp. xxii + 303. $12.50.
On the book's inside flap, Professor Pottle, himself one of Shelley's most
distinguished readers, calls Prof. Chernaik "one of the best readers of Shelley
I have ever come across" and her book "original and mature" and U without
any polemicism," and the scholarly, clearly written, and intelligent book that
follows fulfills a good deal of this promise, offering, as a bonus, over one hundred pages of newly-edited and corrected texts of the poems discussed in the
first-half of the book. Together with the recent work of Abrams on Shelley'S
place in Romantic thinking about apocalypse and the complex philosophical
readings of Earl Wassennan, The Lyrics of Shelley should go a long way toward
refuting those charges of mawkishness, imprecision, and impalpability that twentieth century critics have brought against Shelley and which he has never quite
managed to shake. There is a considerable distance between what used to be
called the "licentious phrasing" of "The Cloud" and Mrs. Chernaik's remark
that "any stanza" of the poem "will serve to illustrate the freedom and spontaneity of the imagery and its inventiveness in relation to natural fact." (133)
Yet, there is something missing from her book which it is no easy matter to
identify. Shelley'S rival, Keats, would have rested his diagnosis on the observation that "there is nothing to be intense upon; no women one feels mad to kiss,
no face swelling into reality." I would have preferred to leave it at that but
since the critical assumption behind what I am going to say-that while Mrs.
Chemaik's book is an excellent "horse.," it ought to have been a II tiger "-may
be erroneous, I have the obligation to be more academic than Keats.
The book is devoted primarily to an analysis of the transformations the
recurring images and themes of Shelley'S lyric poetry undergo as one moves
from "Mont Blanc" (Ch. Two) to the poems to Jane Williams like "The
Magnetic Lady to her Patient" (Ch. Seven). Sometimes these analyses center
around a poem or two as in Chapter Three: "The Human Condition" which is
given over almost exclusively to an analysis of " Lines Written among the
Euganean Hills," but more often each chapter contains "mini-essays" on three
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or four related poems, as in Chapter Four on the" political)) odes, which are
continually being made to echo one another and other poems by Shelley as
well. Everything in a Shelley poem reminds Mrs. Chernaik of something somewhere else: "The same terms [of "Ode to the West Wind"J are given a
precise metaphorical meaning in a passage from Laon and Cynthia"; (96) "The
peculiarly mature character of the poet's lament and prayer can be seen by comparing it to the invocation to Alastor;" and (as an example of an interesting
failure to echo) "the very bareness of the last nvo stanzas, the absence of any
statement comparable to that of the closing lines of "Hymn to Intellectual
Beauty" ... make the conclusion of the poem susceptible to a number of interpretations." (95) Because Mrs. Chernaik can do this kind of circling back,
around and through the poetry so well, she generates a sense of the cohesion
and consistency of Shelley's poetry which, Lord knows, we have been hard
pressed to see. But the technique is not completely satisfying, because it often
seems a substitute for raising questions about fonn in Shelley and, above all,
about his language, even though the examination of "The Figure of the Poet"
in the opening chapter is supposed to function, I imagine, as the issue at stake in
all these analyses and does, in fact, end with a good question: "How should we
relate a theory of the imagination that insists upon its creativity, its power to
infonn and give value to life, with a symbolic rendering of the poet as passive,
dependent, subj ect to a vision that can neither be summoned nor recalled . . .?"
(29) That question can be asked in still more general tenns than Prof. Chernaik
asks it, but I do not believe it can be answered by the kind of analyses she
makes of the poems. We need more than" As the body of the poem is framed
by an allegory for human life, so the meditation is organized by the progress
of the day from sunrise to sunset" (67) (and I do not believe I have misrepresented the weakness by choosing an untypical instance) to satisfy the claims
of the question.
The problem appears as early as the "Introduction" to the book. H If we are
to recover what the Romantic poet has to say to our age, we must return to
the idea of poetry as comprehensive in scope, proposing a whole view of life,
of society as well as the self, political and philosophical as well as psychological." (6) Who will not welcome such a return?-until he notices the fudging
in "proposing." We cannot recover this view-and I concur that the problem
is profoundly political in character-because we know very little about the
Romantic mode of proposal. There is a book out there on the politics of
Romantic fonn still to be written which will ask Prof. Chernaik's question but
will have to proceed from a very different conception of poetic activity and of
the "body" of a poem if it intends to show how the "poet's function is ..•
to create in language the forms his imagination craves." (46) But in fact the
whole point is whether it is even possible to create such linguistic forms when
what the Romantic imagination" craves" is a form which shall also be a process.
When Shelley refers to his language as "Daedal" or "subtler" we may feel
he describes less than he thinks, but he obviously intends to convey a dissatisfaction with available and received forms. What can serve as a model in
this poetic predicament? One might even define the Romantic poem as the first
poem which had to be its own-and only its own-model, which explains,
incidentally, why Romantic poetry is as often likely to be awful as it is powerful;
Prof. Chernaik could use a surer sense of what in Shelley it is just not possible
to redeem.
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She does not transmit a sense of the excitement-and the embarrassment-that
this exploration of the possibilities of fonn entails because, in part, her own
models for deciding when the poems work, while they are pm of the critical
equipment we all assimilate, do not seem able to disclose the poem she affirms.
Not the least of our debts to her book stems from its demonstration of the
limitation of our approaches to Romantic poetry: as long as we continue to
talk the critical language of those who have always mistrusted Romantic poetry
the battle cannot possibly be won. The central Shelleyan text, set against the
background of Demogorgon's view that a voice/ Is wanting, the deep truth is
imageless," will probably continue to be that investigation of the relationship
of power to fonn which is stanza XLIII of Adonais on plastic stress." The
endlessly unfolding and openended character of all fonns, natural and poetic,
which I take that passage to celebrate raises questions· about every degree of
Romantic poetic activity: about the dynamics of poetic structure, about whether
Romantic poems can end," about the status of the poem as a single unit, and,
in the case of Coleridge, about why we do not see the U wholeness" of his
fragments. For this reason, I believe that the image of the organizing circle
which Prof. Abrams' brilliant new book offers to us, and which Prof. Chemaik's
readings often seem to imply, will not totally do. The best teacher of poetry
I know believes that the explanatory model will tum out to be not geometric
or mathematical but biological, and a colleague, who persuades me more than
I care to be persuaded that art is a form of propaganda, is sure the model will
be political. (How do we distinguish a progressive poetic form from a reactionary one?) In any case, while we are waiting, Prof. Chemaik's book significantly
contributes to the debate.
(I
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